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Over the past few weeks, a new round of confrontation has manifested itself in the Eastern Mediterranean. Greek and Turkish 
naval forces were engaged in a military standoff in 
the waters of the Aegean Sea for almost two months. 
The standoff came after the Turkish survey ship Oruc 
Reis, accompanied by Turkish Navy vessels, sailed into 
waters the Greek government considers part of its 
continental shelf. The Greek response was to deploy 
warships on its own. In essence, Turkey was seeking to 
challenge the Exclusive Economic Zone demarcation 
agreement between Greece and Egypt, signed in August 
of 2020, which had, in turn, challenged a maritime 
rights memorandum signed by Turkey and the UN-
backed Libyan Government of National Accord (GNA) 
in November 2019. The Turkish move signified a new 
level of contestation in the region. Turkey has utilised 
similar tactics in its dispute with Cyprus over the past 
two years, but it had never resorted to using them in its 
antagonisms with its NATO ally—until now.1 For now, 
tensions have turned down a notch since Turkey has 
withdrawn its forces and Oruc Reis from the region 
with the two sides agreeing to exploratory talks. Talks 
of this kind have been on-and-off for almost twenty 
years, producing very little so far. Their prospects of 
success may be described as dim at best.
Some have 
read the current 
confrontation as 
another chapter in 
the Greco-Turkish 
confrontation over 
the Aegean that 
dates back to the 
1970s, and indeed to 
many centuries (and 
millennia) before 
that. However, this 
confrontation is 
part of a broader 
power game in the 
region that has 
been going on for 
the past decade.
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Some have read the current confrontation as another 
chapter in the Greco-Turkish confrontation over the 
Aegean that dates back to the 1970s, and indeed 
to many centuries (and millennia) before that.2 
However, this confrontation is part of a broader 
power game in the region that has been going on 
for the past decade. Hydrocarbon discoveries, the 
Arab Spring, the withdrawal of the US from the region 
and the breakdown of Turkey’s relations with Israel 
and Egypt created new fault lines in the Eastern 
Mediterranean while reinforcing old ones. Initially, 
these developments brought Israel and Egypt closer 
to Greece and Cyprus. Furthermore, the reignition of 
the Libyan conflict led to the active involvement of 
regional and extra-regional powers. Turkey provided 
military support to Libya’s GNA while France, the UAE, 
Greece, Cyprus and Egypt have supported renegade 
military commander Khalifa Haftar. France has also 
come in strong on the side of Greece and Cyprus by 
condemning Turkey and committing military forces in 
the region “to better monitor the situation in this part 
of the Mediterranean and to ensure that international 
law is respected,” according to French President 
Emmanuel Macron.3  Therefore, the current conflict is 
not merely an issue between Greece and Turkey, but 
rather a much more complicated international affair.
Consequently, bilateral talks between Greece and 
Turkey, like the ones agreed recently, can only go so 
far. A return to tensions in the near future is more 
than likely. Greece, for its part, is preparing for it. 
Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis announced plans 
to boost the Greek airforce with French fighter jets 
while the navy will acquire at least four new frigates. 
A solution to this regional dispute can only come 
through a multilateral agreement across the Eastern 
Mediterranean regarding maritime borders and the 
exploitation of the region’s hydrocarbons. The only 
party that has the capacity to push all affected parties 
to the table is the US. All major players in the region 
A solution to this 
regional dispute can 
only come through a 
multilateral agreement 
across the Eastern 
Mediterranean 
regarding maritime 
borders.
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are considered vital US allies. Greece and 
Turkey are NATO allies while Egypt and Israel 
have been vital pillars to US policy in the 
Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean 
for decades. The first step for the US is 
mediation between Greece and Turkey 
to foster the conditions for a multilateral 
arrangement in the Eastern Mediterranean.
MEDIATION EFFORTS AND THE 
LACK OF US LEADERSHIP
The tensions between Greece and Turkey 
not only have significant implications for the 
bilateral ties of the two countries, they may 
also further complicate EU-Turkey relations 
and affect the integrity of NATO itself. The 
concerted attempts by Germany and Malta 
have so far helped to bring about this new 
round of exploratory talks. However, despite 
this positive development, it might be hard 
for the EU to remain impartial. Cyprus has 
made clear that it will continue to veto 
EU sanctions concerning Belarus unless 
similar sanctions are imposed on Turkey. 
If the EU does indeed follow through with 
sanctions against Turkey, then the capacity 
of its members to act as mediators in the 
unfolding Eastern Mediterranean dispute 
will be limited since the EU’s impartiality will 
be damaged in Turkey’s eyes. Greece and 
Cyprus, on the other hand, are expecting 
the EU to stand firmly by their side; if the 
EU fails to do so, i.e. by not approving 
sanctions against Turkey, public trust in the 
EU in both Greece and Cyprus, and possibly 
other European states, would be severely 
diminished. Already the shuttle diplomacy 
of German Foreign Minister Heiko Maass 
and Germany’s stance in the Foreign Affairs 
Councils has not been viewed in a positive 
eye by many in both Greece and Cyprus.  
Mediation ought to come from either 
NATO or the US. In the case of NATO, 
General Secretary Jens Stoltenberg’s 
attempt to bring the two sides to the table 
was met with a Greek rejection. Generally, 
the organisation’s capacity has been hit 
by the Trump administration’s stance 
since the US President assumed office in 
2016. Both the US and many of its allies 
have grown disillusioned with the alliance. 
President Trump has publicly declared that 
he sees little use for the preservation of 
NATO, thereby encouraging some NATO 
member states to lessen their reliance 
on the organisation. The resulting policy 
trend and attitude shift has exacerbated 
NATO’s vulnerability to internal quarrels and 
reflected the indifference of many of NATO’s 
members to resolving them.
At the same time, the US, the power that 
both Turkey and Greece have relied upon 
for security since the days of the Truman 
Doctrine and their NATO induction in 1952, 
has played a minimal role so far. This is a first 
in contemporary Greco-Turkish relations as 
the US had stepped in to prevent hostilities 
between the two sides and safeguard the 
integrity of NATO on several occasions 
throughout the 20th century. The only case 
in which the US was unable to successfully 
mediate between the two sides ended in 
the disastrous 1974 invasion of Cyprus 
by Turkish troops which has divided the 
island in two. The Cyprus Problem remains 
a frozen conflict and a thorn complicating 
both EU-Turkey and EU-NATO relations, as 
well as Turkey’s bilateral relations with the 
US. So far, the White House has shown 
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little interest in the matter. In the initial 
stages of the confrontation, Mike Pompeo 
held separate meetings with his Greek 
and Turkish counterparts, and President 
Trump held phone calls with Prime Minister 
Mitsotakis and President Erdogan. Most 
recently, Mike Pompeo visited Cyprus 
where he claimed that Turkey’s actions are 
“deeply concerning”. He was there signing 
a Memorandum of Understanding with the 
Cypriot government that will establish a 
joint training centre on the island to “provide 
expertise for the rest of the region on 
security and non-proliferation”. 
 
THE NEED FOR US LEADERSHIP
As things stand, the only party that has 
the weight to push both sides towards a 
solution is the US. President Trump enjoys 
a great personal relationship with President 
Erdogan, while Greece, especially with 
the present administration, views the US 
as a strategic ally. With these diplomatic 
strengths, the US must approach the 
matter in three steps. The first should aim 
to prolong the current de-escalation. The 
second should focus on bringing the two 
sides closer to a solution by illustrating the 
benefits of their cooperation. Third, given 
that considerable common ground has been 
found between the two sides, the US should 
also push for the expansion of their bilateral 
discussion to a multilateral level.
Maintaining the current de-escalation is 
vital. At this point, no other foreign leader 
seems to hold greater sway over Erdogan 
than Trump. This is something that could 
be exploited by the US’ side by pushing 
Erdogan to keep Turkish forces away from 
the disputed region. In the case of another 
standoff, the risk of an accident that could 
lead to open hostilities that neither side 
wanted will reappear. The collision between 
a Greek and a Turkish frigate in August 
illustrated this danger. The de-escalation 
will be short-lived if the two sides do not 
commit to a dialogue for the delimitation of 
their maritime boundaries. This effort can 
be aided if the two sides understand that 
the Eastern Mediterranean’s hydrocarbon 
riches, central to the present quarrel, have 
a greater revenue potential if they are 
sold regionally. 
Natural gas prices in European markets 
have been under $4.50 per British Thermal 
Unit (BTU) since 2018 and are projected to 
remain below this level for the next decade 
or so.4 At the same time, the estimated 
cost of natural gas delivered to European 
Markets by the proposed EastMed pipeline 
supported by Greece, Israel, and Cyprus 
stands at around $7 to $8 per BTU, being 
far more expensive than the Russian gas 
option.5 The EastMed will also have minimal 
impact in lessening Europe’s dependency 
on Russian gas since it can only provide 10 
billion cubic meters (bcm) of natural gas to 
the EU market that consumed approximately 
470 bcm in total during 2019, with roughly 
40% being Russian gas. Additionally, the 
construction of the pipeline is a challenging 
feat both technically and politically since it 
will have to pass through maritime areas 
disputed by Turkey. Hence, it is unlikely that 
Eastern Mediterranean gas becomes vital to 
European gas marketsand, more importantly, 
an alternative to Russian pipe gas.
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This latter point is a critical factor in the strategising 
of US lawmakers in the Eastern Mediterranean. The 
proposed bipartisan Eastern Mediterranean Energy and 
Security Partnership Act states that one of its goals 
is to lessen the EU’s dependency on Russian gas by 
further facilitating the trilateral partnership between 
Greece, Israel, and Cyprus. However, the region’s gas 
will not have the impact US lawmakers hoped for as 
it is too expensive. It cannot significantly shift the EU’s 
dependency on Russian gas. The EastMed pipeline, for 
the time being, lacks market support. This realisation 
will also help realign US strategy in the region on more 
pragmatic grounds.
Instead, the Eastern Mediterranean’s gas could be 
sold regionally. Already Israel and Egypt are exploiting 
their gas assets for internal consumption, and plans 
have been made for the export of Cypriot gas to 
Egypt. In 2019 the East Mediterranean Gas Forum was 
established by Greece, Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, 
Italy and Palestine to boost regional cooperation on 
hydrocarbon exploitation with a focus on promoting 
an Eastern Mediterranean market. Notably, Turkey is 
absent. Turkey’s market has annual needs between 
50-55 bcm of natural gas, importing 38 bcm per year. 
The Eastern Meditteranean’s gas can be an option for 
Turkey, and it would make more sense market-wise for 
regional states to sell to Turkey than to Europe. The US 
would stand to benefit from this development since it 
would lessen Turkish dependency from Russia; thus, 
lessening Russian influence vis-à-vis Turkey. 
There could be important benefits for Turkey too. 
Turkey has been heavily reliant on Russian gas with 
more than 40% of the country’s imports coming from 
Gazprom.6 Furthermore, Turkey is paying more than two 
times the price Gazprom is selling to Europe according 
to Turkey’s Petroleum Pipeline Corporation (BOTAŞ) 
during the second quarter of the year.7 Turkish officials 
are exploring different and cheaper options such as 
LNG exports. Moreover, President Erdogan recently 
announced a gas discovery in the Black Sea that could 
US leadership is 
much needed to 
de-escalate tensions 
in the Eastern 
Mediterranean. As 
things stand, no 
other party has 
the clout to push 
Greece and Turkey 
towards a lasting 
diplomatic solution.
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help Turkish efforts of energy diversification 
and independence. In this respect, the 
Eastern Mediterranean gas could help in 
Turkish efforts to diversify, but if tensions do 
not ease the gas-producing potential of the 
region could be hampered. The US should 
highlight these points in its discussions with 
Greece, Turkey and other regional players. 
The current political impasse makes 
things difficult for gas developments or 
explorations in the Eastern Mediterranean. 
US policymakers should make this point 
clear to all parties. The standoff and the 
uneasiness that surrounds it will more likely 
scare off potential investors. A solution 
to the issue could be allowing Greece to 
develop its resources with Turkey becoming 
the leading buyer. The costs for transporting 
to Turkey would be minimal due to the 
distance, while there is also a gas pipeline 
that could be used for the transportation of 
gas between both sides. Turkey currently 
has a multiplicity of options for its gas 
imports, so even if things turn sour again, 
it can still move away to other options. In 
such a scenario, the East Med’s gas could 
be a cheaper option than Russia’s gas, and 
it may also be competitive with gas imports. 
A deal that would benefit Turkey would also 
allow Greece and Cyprus to exploit their 
hydrocarbon potential without the threat 
of a military escalation. In short, it is a win-
win situation if the states can overcome the 
security dilemma and centuries of distrust.
For such a scenario to materialise, a 
Greco-Turkish agreement on demarcation 
of their economic zones would be a 
prerequisite before proceeding to any actual 
trading cooperation. There is a long-standing 
debate on the matter in both countries 
with some analysts favouring the dispute 
to be solved in an international court. This 
pathway has been tried in the past, but 
the International Court of Justice in 1978 
deemed itself unfit to provide a solution. 
Since then the introduction of the United 
Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS) in 1982 has complicated matters 
even more by introducing the concept of the 
EEZ, with its demarcation becoming another 
point of contestation between the two sides. 
Instead, the US could facilitate the 
dialogue by pressing hard on the mutual 
economic benefits of this solution. Parallel 
to this, the US should also try to foster a 
renewed dialogue on the Cyprus Problem 
from where it was left off in 2017. Any 
progress in those dialogues will allow Turkey 
to be incorporated in the nascent regional 
infrastructure surrounding hydrocarbon 
exploration. A solution to these issues or 
at least some progress will enable Turkey 
to become part of the process rather 
than an outlier.
The next move that US policymakers 
can make to bring Turkey to the table and 
facilitate dialogue is the carrot of financial 
help. The Turkish economy is in a dire 
position with the country’s GDP projected 
to contract by approximately 10% this year. 
The Turkish lira has been destabilised, 
hitting record lows against the dollar in 
August 2020 with inflation soaring. Regional 
cooperation could ease things for Erdogan 
and his government. A protracted standoff 
and a hostile stance would mean billions 
spent on the military on both sides of the 
Aegean when they could have been used 
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elsewhere. Moreover, a de-escalation by 
Turkey and a commitment to dialogue 
could be accompanied by a financial 
support package supported by the US, 
the EU and the IMF. Such a development 
will also provide new life to the strenuous 
relationship of Turkey not only with Greece 
but with NATO in general. 
It should be noted that offering financial 
support to Turkey will also reduce the danger 
of Turkey becoming a target for China’s 
geoeconomic policy. Turkey has already 
used a $400 million scheme to exchange 
liras with renminbi in recent months, and 
according to Chinese officials Turkey 
features prominently in the plans for China’s 
Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).8 9 The current 
economic crisis could provide the right 
opportunity for China to offer a financial 
lifeline to Erdogan and bring Turkey within 
its sphere of influence, increasing China’s 
foothold in the Eastern Mediterranean. 
Erdogan and the Turkish government 
tacitly seem to acknowledge the prospect 
of Chinese financial support, as they have 
conspicuously remained silent about 
China’s treatment of the Uighur Muslim 
minority (an issue they are generally quite 
vocal about) in an apparent effort to stay in 
Beijing’s good graces. Therefore, providing 
aid and financial assistance to Turkey in this 
hour of need would not only help resolve the 
crisis with Greece, but it would also help to 
minimise China’s economic leverage over 
the country—allowing Istanbul to speak out 
about the grave abuses in Xinjiang. 
CONCLUSION
US leadership is much needed to de-escalate 
tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean. As 
things stand, no other party has the clout to 
push Greece and Turkey towards a lasting 
diplomatic solution. The task at hand is by 
no measure an easy one. Greco-Turkish 
matters are considered ‘national issues’ on 
both sides of the Aegean building on deeply 
rooted nationalist sentiments and a troubled 
history spanning centuries. The present 
situation is also much more complicated 
since it is not merely a dispute between 
Greece and Turkey but the latest episode 
of a region-wide confrontation in the 
Eastern Mediterranean that encompasses 
additional, extra-regional powers, including 
France and the UAE. The question now is 
whether the US is willing to act when it is 
hamstrung by the effects of the pandemic 
at home, caught up in persistent internal 
strife, and diplomatically limited by the 
foreign policy whims of President Trump. 
Unfortunately, time is of the essence. A 
tragedy in the Eastern Mediterranean might 
cause irreparable damage to NATO, one that 
even a Biden victory and return to normalcy 
might not be able to salvage. 
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Crisis has returned to the Eastern Mediterranean 
where Greek and Turkish economic interests, legal 
claims, and armed forces are squaring off. In this 
Strategic Update, Alexandros Zachariades explores 
how the two NATO powers arrived at the current 
confrontation, how the contest intersects with 
issues ranging from China to Libya, and how the 
international community can resolve the tension.
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